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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 860031

JOHN R. REMINGTON,

Category No. 2

Defendant/Appellant•

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a decision filed by the
Court on March 31, 1987. Originally this case was an appeal from
convictions and judgments imposed for Aggravated Robbery, a felony
of the first degree and Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a
Restricted Person, a felony of the second degree and of Being a
Habitual Criminal, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,
Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A summary of the facts is set forth in Brief of Appellant
(Appellant's Brief 1-4).
ARGUMENT
In its per curiam opinion, State v. Remington, Opinion No.
860031 (Utah 1987), this Court has either overlooked or
misapprehended the arguments presented by Appellant and has
misstated and overlooked certain facts critical to this case.

(See

Addendum A ) .
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION
REGARDING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION.

This case involves a request for a cautionary eyewitness
identification instruction in a jury trial which occurred prior to
this Court's decision in State v, Longy 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).
This Court followed the standard applicable to such cases as
clarified in State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986) and State v.
Quevedo, Opinion No, 19049 (Utah 1987), both o£ which were decided
after Appellant submitted his brief.

The applicable pre-Long

standard is as follows:
"Prior to Long, the law was that it lay within a
trial judge's discretion whether an eyewitness
identification instruction . . . was given,
[citations omitted] However, this Court also
stated prior to Long that the failure to give an
eyewitness instruction might be an abuse of
discretion where there were serious questions
about the reliability of the eyewitness
identification. [citations omitted] (emphasis
added).
State v. Quevedo, supra at 2.
In State v. Jonas, supra, this Court held for the first
time that a trial judge had abused his discretion in failing to give
a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction.

In that case,

serious questions as to the reliability of the identification arose
where:

(1)

the victim had little opportunity to observe his

assailant; (2)

the witness initially described his assailant as

clean-shaven, but later changed his description to include a
mustache;

(3)

the witness described an assailant with a crooked

nose yet selected a photo of the Appellant who did not have a
crooked nose;

(4)

the victim's trial testimony showed that he was

uncertain and hesitant in the way in which he selected the defendant
during the photo array; and, (5)

there were no other witnesses or

corroborating evidence.
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In State v. Quevedo, supra, this Court did not find serious
questions as to the reliability of the eyewitness identification and
held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing
to give a cautionary instruction.

In that case, four police

officers, trained to make such identifications, positively
identified the defendant at trial as the driver of a vehicle fleeing
the scene of a robbery.
for three years.

One of the officers had known the defendant

The officers located Quevedo in a nearby

apartment, shortly after the fleeing getaway car crashed.

An

occupant of the apartment stated, "I don't know what he done, he
just ran in here."

When arrested, Quevedo wore the same jacket that

the fleeing driver had worn.
The identification in the present is subject to serious
concerns as to its reliability similar to those in Jonas. As was
the case with the victim in Jonas, Mr. Cruser, the victim in this
case, had little opportunity to view his assailant.

Mr. Cruser was

unable to get much of a look at his assailant's face.

He viewed it

briefly as the person entered and left the store (T. 81-82).

During

most of the three to five minutes that the robber was in the store,
Mr. Cruser was lying on the floor and could see only his pants and
shoes (T. 72).
Mr. Cruser's trial testimony established his own
uncertainty as to the identification of Mr. Remington as the
assailant.

He never made an in court identification of Mr.

Remington even though Remington's appearance on the day of the trial

- 3 -

was the same as it had been on the day of the robbery (T. 152). On
direct examination, the prosecutor did not ask Mr. Cruser for an in
court identification of his assailant.

Instead, the prosecutor

focused on Mr. Cruser's identification of Mr. Remington from a photo
spread (T. 67-81).

On cross-examination by counsel for Mr. Kalisz,

Mr. Cruser positively identified Mr. Kalisz as the robber after
reviewing the photograph of Mr. Remington which he had previously
identified (T. 92).1

Mr. Cruser also acknowledged that he had told

the prosecutor that he was not sure Mr. Remington had committed the
crime unless he dyed his hair (T. 91).
Mr. Cruser's description of his assailant did not fit Mr.
Remington, just as the initial description of his assailant by the
victim in Jonas did not fit the defendant in that case.

Cruser

described a sandy haired man with a light moustache and selected
Kalisz.

(T. 89-90, 92, 96). Mr. Remington has dark brown hair (T.

52).
Clearly, Mr. Cruser's in court identification of Kalisz,
not Remington, as his assailant coupled with his failure to identify
Remington at all in person even though Remington's appearance had
not changed, raised serious doubts as to the reliability of Cruser's
identification of Remington from a photo spread.

1 The record as to which defendant is being identified by witnesses
is slightly confusing. Mr. Cruser identifies the man in the tan
coat as looking more like his assailant than anyone else (T. 92).
Officer Faraone later clarifies that the defendant in the caramel
colored jacket is Kalisz (T. 123).
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Mr. Cruser testified that he thought his assailant had been
in the store earlier in the day (T. 69-70).

Linking this testimony

to Mr. Remington raises the same serious doubts as to reliability
since Mr. Cruser did not positively identify Mr. Remington as the
robber and demonstrated his own inability to accurately perceive,
recall and identify an individual.
Corroborating evidence sufficient to overcome the serious
doubts as to the identification of Mr. Remington as the robber did
not exist in this case.

In its opinion in this case, the court

focused on Malidina Engelhardt's identification of Mr. Remington as
the man in her store twenty minutes before the robbery as an
important factor in showing the reliability of Mr. Cruser's
identification of Mr. Remington from the photo spread.

However, Ms.

Engelhardt's identification does not place Mr. Remington in the
Cruser jewelry store and is as susceptible to problems with
eyewitness identification as the testimony of Mr. Cruser. Ms.
Engelhardt was talking to her boyfriend when a man entered her store
(T. 43). The man stood ten feet away and wore a baseball cap and
sunglasses (T. 44). He was in the store three to four minutes, but
she did not really look at him (T. 51). Clearly, Ms. Engelhardt did
not have much of an opportunity to view the man in her store.
After the robbery, officers took Ms. Englehardt to view Mr.
Kalisz.

She looked at him for three to four minutes, then told

officers he was not the man who had been in her store because Mr.
Kalisz was thinner, had long blonde hair and wore a blue terry cloth
rather than cotton shirt.

After inspecting Mr. Kalisz for up to

four minutes on the day of the robbery, she did not remember him at
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trial (T. 60-61).

Her own testimony showed her ability to recall

faces and persons was subject to scrutiny and emphasized the need
for a cautionary instruction in regard to her identification of the
man in her store.

Her identification twenty minutes before the

incident in a location other than the scene of the crime is in stark
contrast to the identification made by four trained police officers
immediately after following a fleeing suspect in Quevedo.
In its opinion in this case, the Court stated that the man
in Ms. Engelhardt's store asked her what time it was.

The record

reveals that the man never asked her what time it was; instead, he
asked her what time the store closed, at which point Ms. Engelhardt
looked at her watch (T. 45).
The Court also stated that Remington left in the direction
of Cruser Jewelry.

The record reveals that Ms. Engelhardt testified

that approximately twenty minutes before the robbery, the man exited
her store to the north, but that she did not watch where he went (T.
58-59).

The record does not establish that the man in Ms.

Engelhardt's store went towards Cruser Jewelry.
In its opinion, this Court stated that "a robbery had taken
place in the Brickyard Plaza and that the search centered on a black
Monte Carlo getaway car which had spun out and hit the curb before
leaving the Brickyard Plaza."

State v. Remington, supra at 2.

The

record reveals that two independent investigations occurred
simultaneously immediately after the robbery.

One investigation

involved an attempt to locate Mr. Remington and the Monte Carlo he
had borrowed from Mr. Argyle's car lot (T. 118-120).

The other

involved a search for a suspect in the Cruser Jewelry robbery and
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included information that some children saw a black car spin on
gravel at the Brickyard Plaza (T. 134, 187). Neither the children
nor anyone else who allegedly saw a black getaway car testified at
trial.

The statement that the getaway car hit the curb and was a

Monte Carlo appear to be Officer Faraone's embellishment of the
broadcast regarding a black getaway car at Brickyard Plaza.
In its opinion, this Court focused on the alleged scuff
mark on the Monte Carlo as corroborating evidence which rendered Mr.
Cruser's failure to identify Remington at trial negligible.

Officer

Faraone testified that there was no indication the Monte Carlo was
damaged from hitting a curb, but that on the right rear tire there
was a scuff mark (T. 136). Mr. Argyle, the car's owner, did not
mention a scuff mark and did not establish that if there were a
scuff mark, it was not present when the car left his lot. He
testified that other than the possibility that the stickers might
have been removed and reapplied, nothing about the car was amiss (T.
26).

As previously outlined, noone testified who had allegedly seen

the car leave the brickyard and hit the curb.

Where the state

presents no evidence that the mark was not there when the car left
the lot and no foundational evidence as to what exactly was seen in
regard to a getaway car and damage to that car, the jury could only
speculate as to whether the scuff mark tied Mr. Remington to the
robbery.

This is not evidence which overcomes the serious doubts

raised by Mr. Cruser's inconclusive identification testimony.
In addition, in the opinion in State v. Kalisz, Opinion No.
860032 (Utah 1987), (See Addendum B), this Court stated that nothing
in the evidence tied Mr. Kalisz to the getaway car.
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If Mr. Kalisz

who was positively identified by numerous witnesses as the person
who drove the Monte Carlo into Steve's Used Car Lot, cannot be tied
to the getaway car, then, conversely, the getaway car cannot be
linked to the Monte Carlo and its alleged scuff mark.

Based on the

decision in Kalisz that Kalisz could not be linked to the getaway
car, any evidence relating to the Monte Carlo should be disregarded.
The opinion in this case points out that Kalisz1 statement
that he had taken Remington to the hospital for an appendicitus
attack, coupled with evidence that the statement was false, is
evidence on which the jury could have relied.

However, the state

did not establish that Mr. Remington had not checked into the
hospital.

The prosecutor asked a hearsay question in an attempt to

establish that Mr. Remington had not gone to the hospital.

Defense

counsel objected and the answer was stricken (T. 143-144).

The jury

should not have considered the answer as evidence, nor should this
court in determining whether corroborating evidence sufficient to
outweigh the serious concerns raised by Mr. Cruser's testimony
existed.2
As outlined in Appellant's brief, the watch found on Mr.
Remington's person provides very little evidence.
very common brand without serial number.

The watch is a

Noone knew whether Mr.

Remington had the watch with him when he left the prison that
morning.

2 The State in its brief asked the Court to speculate that Mr.
Remington had not been to the hospital since he showed up at prison
later that evening (Respondent's Brief at 8). However, absent
evidence as to the time Remington allegedly checked in, the length
of time one generally spends in the hospital with an appendicitus
attack, or evidence that an individual who incorrectly believes he
has appendicitus and goes to the hospital is never released the same
day, the court simply cannot make such a leap in the evidence.
- 8
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Finally, the timing involved in this incident enhances the
doubt caused by Mr. Cruser's failure to identify Mr. Remington in
court.

The robbery occurred at approximately 5:20 p.m.; Cruser's

alarm at his Brickyard Plaza store went off at 5:31.

The Monte

Carlo arrived downtown several miles away, in the midst of rush hour
traffic at 5:46.

According to the state's theory, in approximately

sixteen minutes, Kalisz picked up Remington, dropped off both
Remington and all the items taken in the robbery and drove to
Steve's Car Lot.
A careful review of the facts in this case establishes that
they are aligned with those in Jonas.

Mr. Cruser, the only person

to witness the robbery, raised some very serious concerns as to the
reliability of his photo identification of Mr. Remington.

The

remaining evidence presented by the State failed to corroborate that
identification and did not overcome the serious doubts that Mr.
Remington was the person in Cruser Jewelry Store.

Because of this,

the trial judge abused his discretion in failing to give the
requested cautionary identification instruction.
II.

THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.

Although the State argues that it presented sufficient
evidence to convict Remington, it concedes that "the evidence
presented by the State at trial was not overwhelming."

State v.

Remington, Respondent's brief at 7.
In the per curiam opinion in State v. Kalisz, Opinion No.
860032 (Utah 1987), this Court held that insufficient evidence
existed to convict Mr. Remington's co-defendant, Stephen Kalisz, of
Armed Robbery.

In that case, this Court noted that that:
- 9
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"The state failed to present any evidence that
placed Kalisz at the scene of the robbery or in
the get away car or linked him to the crime
through the possession of any of the stolen
goods. Nonetheless, the prosecutor argued that
Kalisz provided transportation to and from the
scene of the robbery and should therefore be
convicted as Remington's accomplice."
State v. Kalisz, supra at 3.
Yet in this case, the Court held that there was sufficient
evidence to convict Mr. Remington and to overcome the serious doubts
raised by Mr. Cruser's testimony.

As previously outlined, this

Court linked Mr. Remington to the robbery through the black Monte
Carlo returned to Steve's car lot by Kalisz.

However, in the Kalisz

opinion, this Court stated that the evidence did not link Kalisz to
the getaway car.
evidence.

This is an inconsistent view of the same

If the evidence was insufficient to link Kalisz to the

getaway car, it was equally insufficient to link Remington to the
Monte Carlo, and the evidence relating to the Monte Carlo should be
disregarded.
As previously outlined in Point I of this Petition and
Point II of Appellant's brief, Mr. Cruser failed to identify Mr.
Remington in court as his assailant and, in fact, identified Kalisz
as the robber.

Mr. Cruser had a limited view of the robber's face,

yet his only identification of Mr. Remington consists of a head shot
black and white photograph.

Clearly, a photograph does not present

the same details as to height, weight and body build and is more
subject to error than an in person view of an individual.
The prosecutor was willing to ignore as unreliable Mr.
Cruser's in court identification of Mr. Kalisz as the robber and
argue that Kalisz was in the getaway car.
- 10 -

However, the State then

relied on the photograph identification to establish that Mr.
Remington was in the store.

The identification testimony of Mr.

Cruser was wholly inconclusive and insufficient as a matter of law
to establish that Mr. Remington was the robber.
As previously outlined in this Petition and Appellant's
brief, the remaining evidence was replete with flaws and failed to
place Mr. Remington in Cruser's Jewelry Store.

No stolen property

was recovered from either defendant or the Monte Carlo. No
fingerprints belonging to either man were found at the crime scene.
As previously stated in Appellant's brief, several gaps in the
evidentiary fabric exist and the gaps may be crossed only by sheer
speculation.

Speculation is insufficient to sustain a conviction

for armed robbery.

Absent sufficient evidence to sustain the

conviction for armed robbery, the convictions for Possession of a
Weapon by a Restricted person and Being an Habitual Criminal
necessarily fail.
CONCLUSION
Because this court overlooked and misstated critical issues
of fact and law in this case, the Appellant respectfully petitions
this Court to reconsider its decision in this case and reverse his
conviction and remand his case to the district court for either
dismissal of the charges or a new trial.
Respectfully submitted on this jQTX

day of April, 1987.

*KJKJ
KHRIS HARROLD
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, KRIS HARROLD, hereby certify that a four copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236
State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this J^"!
day of April, 1987.

V
V
^
V\^/VK^V
j
KHRIS HARROLD
Attorney for Petitioner
I, KHRIS HARROLD, do hereby certify the following:
(1)

I am the attorney for appellant/petitioner in this

case; and,
(2)

This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court

in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.
Respectfully submitted this ^ 3 / day of April/ 1987.
[RreTHARROLD
KHR
Attorney for Appellant
DELIVERED
day o f A p r i l ,

by
. <<jfc- *-cdzZ/

1987.
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ADDENDUM A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

The State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

John R. Remington,
Defendant and Appellant,

No. 860031
F I L E D
March 3 1 ,

1987

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

PER CURIAM:
Defendant John R. Remington appeals from convictions
of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree
felony, and of being a habitual criminal. Before this Court,
Remington claims error in the trial court's refusal to give a
cautionary jury instruction concerning eyewitness identification and in the jury's conviction on insufficient evidence.
We affirm.
On Saturday, August 17, 1985, between 2:00 and
2:30 p.m., Remington and a friend, John Kalisz, arrived at a
used car lot at Eighth South and Main Streets in Salt Lake
City, Utah. Remington asked the owner if he could test drive
a black 1978 Monte Carlo around the block. He left the truck
in which he had arrived behind on the lot. When he did not
return by 5:00 p.m., the owner searched Remington's truck,
found a Utah State Prison pass bearing Remington's picture,
and contacted the prison and then the police. Officer Faraone
arrived at the car lot at 5:30.
At 5:00 p.m., Remington entered Earth's Originals, a
jewelry store at Brickyard Plaza, where Malinda Engelhardt, an
employee, was talking to a friend. Remington placed himself
in a corner, looked out the window, and asked Engelhardt what
time it was and when the store closed, as he was bringing his
wife in later. Remington then left in the direction of Cruser
Jewelry. Engelhardt testified that Remington wore a light
blue shirt, washed Levis, a baseball cap, and sunglasses. She
did not notice what shoes he wore. Four days after the
robbery, Engelhardt identified Remington from a photo spread
as the man who had been in her store.
Reed Cruser, the seventy-eight-year-old owner of
Cruser Jewelry, testified that the man who robbed him had been
in his store' around 2:00 p.m. that day and entered a second
time around 5:20 p.m., displaying a gun and ordering Cruser to
go to a back room and lie face down before he swept into a
large plastic sack jewelry and watches from drawers and the
display case. Cruser's burglar alarm went off at 5:31 p.m.

At 5:46 p.m., Officer Faraone at the used car lot
received word from dispatch that a robbery had taken place at
the Brickyard Plaza and that the search centered on a black
Monte Carlo getaway car which had spun out and hit the curb
before leaving the Brickyard Plaza. Within minutes, Kalisz
arrived at the used car lot in the Monte Carlo without
Remington and was asked where Remington was. Kalisz reported
that he had taken Remington to St. Mark's Hospital with an
attack of appendicitis. A check with the hospital revealed
that that statement was false. The Monte Carlo had a scuff
mark on the side wall of the right rear tire. The price
stickers had been removed and replaced, but no incriminating
evidence was found inside the car. A backup officer at the
scene testified that Kalisz wore a light blue shirt and high
boots, but could not recall whether he wore Levis or corduroy
pants.
Cruser was brought to the used car lot to confront
Kalisz. Cruser testified that when the robber entered his
store, he wore a blue shirt, tan pants, and gym shoes. He
stated that he did not get a good look at the robber's face
because he could see only the tan pants and gyro shoes after he
lay down on the floor. At the car lot, Cruser thought Kalisz
might be the man who robbed him, but noticed that he wore brand
new boots' instead of gym shoes and was dressed differently.
Two or three days after the robbery, Cruser identified Remington
from the same photo spread that was shown to Engelhardt for
identification, but was unsure and confused at trial whether
Remington was the robber. Remington and Kalisz were tried
together, and some of the confusion may have been caused by the
prosecution, who identified the two defendants by their
respective counsel.
Remington returned to the prison late on the day of
the robbery. He wore tan pants, gym shoes, and a white t-shirt,
as well as a Buiova watch which bore a stamped "?3" and fresh
glue from a removed price tag on the back. Cruser testified
that he had recently returned to the display case an older-model
Bulova watch that had been laid away and never picked up by a
customer and that the "¥2" on the back meant it was a 1983
model. Cruser stated that the watch was a commonly available
watch that he carried in his store. The prison warden did not
know whether Remington had worn the watch on the morning of the
robbery when he left the prison on a work release.
In

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 492 (Utah 1986), we
abandoned our theretofore discretionary approach to cautionary
jury instructions and directed "that in cases tried from this
date forward (June 20, 1986) trial courts shall give such an
instruction whenever eyewitness identification is a central
issue in a case and such an instruction is requested by the
defense." In Long, the State's case hinged on uncorroborated
eyewitness testimony of a single witness, the victim of the
crime. In State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), this Court
No. 860031
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was again faced with a case in which the victim of the crime was
the only eyewitness on whose uncorroborated testimony the jury
had convicted the defendant without the aid of a cautionary
instruction on eyewitness identification. We noted there, as
we do here, that the holding in Long could not be applied
retroactively to the case before us, as it was tried before our
decision in Long was rendered. We then continued in Jonas:
In each of our pre-Long cases involving the
refusal of a trial court to give a cautionary instruction, we have held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion under the
particular circumstances presented, although
we did expressly recognize "that under suitable circumstances a cautionary instruction
of the type requested would be required."
State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d at 316.
We then distinguished State v. Jonas as presenting a
classic example of circumstances under which a cautionary
instruction on reliability of eyewitnesses was necessary,
reciting the particular facts of that case.
In contrast, the case before us today fits easily into
the rubric of all those pre-Long cases that we cited in Jonas,
Corroborating evidence of Remington's presence at the Brickyard
Plaza around the time of the robbery came from Engelhardt, who
positively identified him from a photo spread. There was other
inculpating, albeit circumstantial, evidence that rendered the
discrepancies in Cruser's testimony negligible when balanced
against the demonstrable evidence, such as the scuff mark on
the car and the items worn by Remington upon his late return to
the prison. The sighting of the Monte Carlo at the Brickyard
Plaza immediately after the robbery, the return of that car to
the used car lot within a short time thereafter, the absence of
Remington in the Monte Carlo and at the hospital, all constituted evidence from which the jury could have concluded that
Remington was the man who had robbed Cruser. Under the
circumstances, the trial court's refusal to give the jury
Remington's requested cautionary instruction* may not be
regarded as an abuse of discretion.
Yl We note the State's request that we not address Remington's
claimed error with respect to the requested jury instruction as
he failed to object to the trial court's refusal to give the
instruction. We generally decline to review claimed error
under those circumstances, State v. Evans, 688 P.2d 566 (Utah
1983), and notice failure to give an instruction without
objection only when that failure would plainly result in a
miscarriage of justice. State v. Leslie, 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah
1983) . Though the trial court's failure in this case did not
result in a miscarriage of justice, we have addressed the issue
here only because of our intervening decision in Long.

3

No. fifinmn

In light of what has just been said, our deferential
review of the jury's verdict precludes us from substituting our
judgment for that of the jury so long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings
of all the requisite elements of the crime could be reasonably
made* State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985).
The convictions are affirmed.

Stewart, Associate Chief Justice, concurs in the
result.
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

Stephen John Kalisz,
Defendant and Appellant.

No. 860032
F I L E D
March 3 1 ,

1987

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

PER CURIAM:
Defendant Stephen John Kalisz appeals from his
conviction of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony under
section 76-6-302 of the Utah Criminal Code. Kalisz's conviction stems from the same aggravated robbery charge that
resulted in the conviction of John R. Remington, State v.
Remington, slip op. 860031, filed March 31, 1987. Kalisz's
appeal raises the same legal issues advanced in Remington:
(1) failure of the trial court to give a cautionary eyewitness
instruction, and (2) insufficiency of the evidence to convict
Kalisz of aggravated robbery. We reverse the conviction for
insufficiency of evidence and do not reach the remaining issue.
The State concedes that under our standard of review
of jury verdicts in criminal cases, the evidence presented at
trial appears to have been insufficient to support defendant's
conviction. State v. Johnson, 663 P.2d 48 (Utah 1983); State
v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). In reviewing a defendant's conviction, we do not substitute our judgment for that
of the jury. "So long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry
stops." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).
However, our narrow independent review of the record in this
case leads us to conclude that here there was no evidence from
which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime could
reasonably have been drawn. We therefore reverse.
The facts of this case are stated at length in
Remington and will be repeated here only briefly. Remington
was accompanied by Kalisz when he arrived in his truck at a
used car lot at 8th South and Main Streets in Salt Lake City,
Utah, to test drive a 1978 Monte Carlo. Kalisz was the man who
returned the Monte Carlo to the used car lot hours later and

within minutes after a robbery had been reported at the
Brickyard Plaza* Kalisz admitted to the police officer at the
used car lot that he had been the man who was with Remington
when they picked up the Monte Carlo and that he had driven
around with Remington for "a couple of hours.1' Kalisz also
claimed to have taken Remington to a local hospital with an
attack of appendicitis. That statement was proven to be
untrue. Kalisz was arrested and searched. No incriminating
evidence was found on his person or in the car. A search of
Kalisz's residence turned up no evidence of the robbery.

6

JThe State failed to present any evidence that placed
Kalisz at the scene of the robbery or in the getaway car or
linked, him to the crime through possession of any of the stolen
goods.) Nonetheless, the prosecutor argued that Kalisz provided
transportation to and from the scene of the robbery and should
therefore be convicted as Remington's accomplice. U.C.A.,
1953, § 76-2-202 (1978 ed.). 1 The circumstantial evidence
connecting Kalisz to Remington and the crime is insufficient
to prove that Kalisz was with Remington during or immediately
after the robbery and that he had the requisite mental state
for the crime with which he was charged. Accordingly, the
conviction is reversed, and Kalisz is ordered discharged.

1.

Section 76-2-202 provides:
Every person, acting with the mental
state required for the' commission of an
offense who directly commits the offense,
who solicits, requests, commands, encouragesi
or intentionally aids another person to
engage in conduct which constitutes an
offense shall be criminally liable as a
party for such conduct.
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